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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this paper is on how to energize the space industrial base as directed by the 
National Security Space Strategy of 2011. Using a case study of the Mid-Atlantic 
Regional Spaceport (MARS), an analysis of how to enable the commercial space 
transportation industry will be discussed. A look at previous government ventures that 
have been privatized, along with the history of commercial space transportation, sets the 
stage for evaluating the future of the industry. An in-depth analysis of FAA and NASA 
regulation was done to compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages of each 
and provide insight on the future regulation of the industry. Past launches, government 
funding, and future plans are all studied to determine a forecast for demand. 
Recommendations are provided to the MARS on how to enable their commercial space 
transportation industry and conclusions are drawn on the importance of the commercial 
space transportation industry to National Security. 
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A recurring theme in recent space policy is the emphasis on leveraging the 
commercial space industry. An example is one of the goals of the 2010 U.S. Space 
Policy: 
Energize competitive domestic industries to participate in global markets 
and advance the development of: satellite manufacturing; satellite-based 
services; space launch; terrestrial applications; and increased 
entrepreneurship. (The White House, 2010) 
The 2011 National Security Space Strategy uses similar terminology in one of its 
three strategic objectives: “Energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national 
security” (The White House, 2011). This language can be found throughout current space 
policy and shows an increasing trend towards relying on the commercial space 
transportation industry. 
This goal of shifting space goods and services from the government to private 
industry is reminiscent of many past government investments. Ventures by the 
government in research and development (R&D) and infrastructure creation are prevalent 
throughout our recent history; such as railroads, telecommunications infrastructure, 
interstate highways, and more recently the airline industry. These examples demonstrate 
how this initial investment, which is often prohibitively expensive for the commercial 
industry, can be a viable investment for the government. This government investment 
attracts private industry into the emerging market and ultimately turns into a new and 
profitable commercial industry. It is in the U.S. Government’s strategic interest to 
provide financial and technical assistance in developing new commercial space 
transportation capabilities (NASA, 2011). 
Current space policy is attempting to give private industries the opportunity to 
capitalize on the space business while simultaneously easing the burden of an 
overextended and underfunded government space program. While the National 




have held the leading role in providing space services, this is beginning to change. The 
commercial expansion into space has prompted the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) to begin regulating these activities while NASA continues to follow their own 
regulations and standards. With NASA’s retirement of the space shuttle program in 2011, 
they will become dependent on the commercial space transportation industry. How the 
FAA, NASA, or some combination of the two will regulate this new industry, is in 
question. Sensible regulation will be required to ensure the success of this emerging 
market. This transition will change how the government, DoD, and commercial industry 






The first privately funded commercial space flight to break the 100 kilometer 
mark was SpaceShipOne built by Scaled Composites in 2004. After a second flight, they 
were awarded the Ansari X-prize for suborbital space flight. This achievement was 
heavily publicized and received attention from numerous companies and investors which 
invigorated the commercial space industry. Even though the commercial space industry 
had been in existence for some time, the X-prize brought worldwide recognition and 
renewed publicity into this emerging industry.  
The first U.S. regulation of the commercial space industry began with the passage 
of the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) in 1984. This act was amended in 2004 
and is the most current policy affecting the commercial space transportation industry. The 
CSLA gives the FAA authority to regulate the commercial space industry and prevents 
the government from being held liable for the high risks associated with suborbital flight. 
This policy allows the use of experimental permits to encourage research and 
development projects without excessive liabilities that would curtail investment. The 
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) was created within the FAA and is 
responsible for regulating and promoting the commercial space transportation industry. 
NASA has also developed its own policy and procedures for space flight, but has 
always maintained oversight and control of its own space services. It is only recently that 
NASA has changed policy to focus on space travel beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). With 
the retirement of the space shuttle program all future access to LEO from the U.S. will be 
purchased from the newly emerging commercial space transportation industry. The first 
phases of this plan include funding resupply missions to the International Space Station 
(ISS) and a Commercial Crew Development Program (CCDev) to provide crew 





The growth of the commercial space transportation industry is apparent based on 
the number of new spaceports already licensed or in the process of being licensed by the 
FAA. Figure 1 displays a map of FAA licensed U.S. spaceports. These spaceports vary in 
their operational status ranging from new construction to existing federal ranges and 
closed military airfields. Several proposed spaceports are in the licensing process while 
others such as the Gulf Coast Regional Spaceport have terminated their plans. Out of all 
the spaceports, only four U.S. based spaceports are licensed to launch payloads to orbit: 
the Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS), Kennedy Space Center, Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, and the Kodiak Launch Complex. 
 
Figure 1.   FAA AST Licensed Spaceports 
C. LAUNCHES 
The graph in Figure 2 shows the increase in commercial launch revenues from 




growth is attributed to increased globalization, technology improvements, deregulation, 
access to previously closed countries, and continued growth in developing countries 
(FAA AST, 2011). Launch demand is expected to continue with the growth of the 
commercial space industry. The availability of new markets such as ISS resupply and 
CCDev will increase U.S. launch demand. These launches do not include the nascent sub-
orbital market that is expected to commence commercial flights in 2013. The U.S. has 
ranked third or fourth in commercial launches over the past four years. A large portion of 
the launch market has been lost to foreign competitors. 
 
Figure 2.   FAA AST Commercial Launch Revenues, 2006–2010 
The U.S. commercial space industry has been hindered by having satellites, 
launch vehicles, and other related components placed on the U.S. Munitions List 
(USML). Any items on the USML require an export license from the U.S. State 




These additional restrictions have prevented some companies from working with 
international customers and have caused delays and cancellations of satellite programs 
(FAA AST, 2011). Thales Alenia Space and Astrium Satellites advertise their products as 
“ITAR-free.” This is possible because they do not use any U.S. parts that fall under the 
USML. This allows them to sell their products to a larger foreign market with less 
regulation. Export reform to remove satellites and related components from the USML 
has been attempted. The latest version, House of Representatives bill 1727, has been in 
committee since May 2011. 
The uncertainty of future launch demand has made it difficult to plan operations 
and pursue savings through economies of scale. The DoD has tried to reduce this 
uncertainty by announcing plans to purchase eight launches per year starting in 2013. 
This was implemented to provide a stable government launch market in the hopes of 
reducing costs. The commercial space transportation industry has no such guarantees and 
must first prove their rockets reliability before they will be considered for government 
launches. Even with this unproven reliability, as of September 2011, SpaceX has signed 
contracts for 38 Falcon 9 launches. 
The economic performance data for Commercial space transportation and enabled 
industries (CST&EI) is shown in CST&EI economic impact totals (in then year dollars). 
Table 1 shows a steady increase in the economic impact from the commercial space 
transportation industry. The economic performance data for launch vehicle 
manufacturing and services industry (LVM&SI) is shown in Table 2 with the previously 
mentioned decline in launches. While the industry has been growing steadily over the 





Table 1.   CST&EI economic impact totals (in then year dollars) 
 
 
Table 2.   LVM&SI economic impact totals (in then year dollars) 
D. POLICY 
The FAA, under the Department of Transportation, created the Office of 
Commercial Space Transportation (AST) to regulate the commercial space market in 
response to the emerging commercial space industry and articles VI and VII of the 1967 




launch operator can be held responsible for any damages or accidents that occur. To 
mitigate this risk the FAA AST was created. Their mission is: 
To ensure the protection of the public, property, and the national security 
and foreign policy interests of the United States during commercial launch 
or reentry activities, and to encourage, facilitate, and promote U.S. 
commercial space transportation. (FAA, 2010) 
This mission and its associated regulations do not currently include NASA 
launches, though they are expected to require FAA licensing in the future (FAA, 2011). 
NASA’s current requirements and regulations could negatively impact 
commercial space. These requirements are the reason NASA is partially funding 
development of crew services in the commercial space industry. NASA understands 
additional requirements lead to additional costs and is willing to offset those costs. 
However, even with NASA funding, this emerging market is prone to failures. For 
example, California-based Rocketplane Kistler Inc. declared bankruptcy in 2010 despite 
NASA funding. While failures in any industry are to be expected, they are especially 
painful in the space sector due to its complexity and high cost. This is compounded by 
the fact that the commercial space transportation market has not yet stabilized with a 
reliable customer base. The jobs, technology, and investment lost due to business failure 
have a negative impact on the entire market. In the case of Rocketplane, the company had 
received 32 million dollars in milestone payments from NASA that could have been 
invested in another commercial space company. The remaining 175 million dollars in 





The FAA has been issuing licenses to the commercial space transportation 
industry since 1995. The Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST) issues 
licenses for commercial launches of orbital and suborbital rockets. AST’s focus on 
promoting and encouraging commercial space transportation is paramount to enabling 
this industry. 
A. ORGANIZATION 
The FAA AST has three divisions: Space Systems Development, Licensing and 
Safety, and Systems Engineering and Training. The Space Systems Development 
Division provides space systems engineering, space policy, and economic and launch 
forecast capabilities. The Licensing and Safety division ensures public health and safety 
by licensing commercial space launches and re-entries. The Systems Engineering and 
Training division defines safety standards for existing and emerging space launch and re-
entry systems and sites while defining methods to assure and verify that those standards 
are met (FAA, 2011). 
B. SCOPE 
FAA AST regulations apply to all non-government sub-orbital and orbital space 
transportation within the United States. The purposes of these regulations are to protect 
the safety of the general public and the crew. Ensuring proper safety without curtailing 
investment is one of the major challenges these regulations pose to potential commercial 
ventures. To encourage investment the FAA’s AST has created a Commercial Space 
Transportation Grant Program. This program has 500,000 dollars available in matching 
grants to be used for space transportation infrastructure projects. These grants were 
awarded to Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska; Mojave Air & Spaceport, California; 





FAA regulation has evolved from the Commercial Space Launch Agreement Act 
of 2004 to the Final Rule on Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew and Space 
Flight Participants. This Final Rule included input from over forty companies and is 
similar to the requirements placed on the airline industry. The safety of the general public 
is the primary concern of this regulation. The safety of the crew and passengers, while 
still important, is based on informed consent with the understanding that space flight is 
dangerous and the FAA does not certify vehicles as being safe for space flight. This Final 
Rule requires insurance and training to ensure all crew members are aware that space 
flight is inherently dangerous (FAA, 2006). 
The current policy prohibits the FAA from regulating crew and passenger safety 
before December 2012, except in the case of casualties or excessive damage. This is 
meant to allow increased research and development in the emerging commercial space 
transportation industry. Since there are no existing data for the majority of new space 
transportation systems being developed, the FAA plans to determine its future policy and 
standards from lessons learned and the sharing of best practices from the commercial 
space transportation companies (GAO, 2011). 
The FAA issues four types of licenses: a launch license (for expendable launch 
vehicles), a reusable launch vehicle mission license, a reentry license, and a launch or 
reentry site operator license. The first three types of licenses are issued to the operator of 
a launch vehicle and the latter is issued to the operator of a spaceport. Figure 3, U.S. 
Commercial Launches, shows the number of FAA licensed and permitted launches from 
1997 to 2010. In 2006, permits were authorized as an alternative to licenses for reusable 
suborbital rockets. Permits may be issued for research and development and to show 
compliance with license requirements and crew training. Permits allow unlimited 



















NASA has created and maintained its own internal regulations for space 
transportation. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA will be reliant on 
commercial services for access to and from Low Earth Orbit (LEO). NASA missions are 
expected to fall under FAA licensing in the future. NASA has published Commercial 
Crew Transportation System Certification Requirements for NASA LEO Missions. This 
new regulation has been vetted by both the commercial industry and government 
agencies. Until the commercial space industry has proven itself to meet NASA’s 
standards, NASA will purchase transportation to the International Space Station (ISS) 
from Russia at approximately 65 million dollars a seat. Through 2015 NASA has 
purchased 46 seats aboard Soyuz vehicles. Figure 4 depicts the cost of purchasing a 
single seat aboard the Soyuz vehicle for launches through 2015. 
 






NASA has started several initiatives to encourage commercial space 
transportation development. These include the Commercial Orbital Transportation 
Services (COTS) program, the Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program, and 
the Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract. NASA funds these programs through 
private industry to support NASA operations. These programs are managed by NASA's 
Commercial Crew and Cargo Program Office (C3PO). The mission of C3PO is to 
“extend human presence in space by enabling an expanding and robust U.S. commercial 
space transportation industry” (NASA, 2010). 
B. SCOPE 
NASA’s new Commercial Crew Transportation policy applies only to NASA 
missions to LEO and would be in addition to any FAA requirements. NASA certification 
would involve validation of technical and performance standards, verification of 
compliance, consideration of relevant operational experience, and acceptance of residual 
technical risk. It also states that NASA will be required to “analyze the risk and decide on 
necessary steps for safety when putting NASA personnel in harm’s way using designs or 
operations that NASA does not control” (NASA, 2010). 
Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contracts were awarded to SpaceX and 
Orbital Sciences Corporation through 2016. SpaceX was awarded 1.6 billion dollars for 
twelve resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Orbital Sciences 
Corporation was awarded 1.9 billion dollars for eight resupply missions. Both private 
companies have made significant progress towards their resupply goals with launches 
scheduled as early as November 2011. SpaceX has recived permission from NASA to 
combine their November test flight and their first ISS docking flight into one mission. 
Orbital Sciences Corporation is planning their initial test flight from Wallops Flight 
Facility (WFF) Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) in December 2011. 
The first round of the Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program was 




Corporation, Sierra Nevada Corporation, and the United Launch Alliance. The associated 
Space Act Agreements (SAA) ranged from one to twenty million dollars with a total of 
fifty million dollars from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. These 
competitive awards are pre-negotiated, milestone-based agreements to support 
commercial space transportation development with a fixed government investment. 
The second round of CCDev included 269 million dollars awarded to the 
following four companies: Blue Origin, Sierra Nevada Corporation, Space Exploration 
Technologies, and the Boeing Company. The awards ranged from twenty-two million 
dollars to ninety-two million dollars. The associated SAA’s have required milestones that 
must be met for these private companies to continue in the program. A third round of 
CCDev will be awarded in 2012. Table 3 lists all commercial crew and cargo awards. 
 




These programs are vital to provide startup space companies a reliable funding 
source to develop these high risk and highly technical space systems. Without this 
investment many of these companies would not be able to sustain themselves in the 
volatile space market. As previously mentioned, Rocketplane, one of the original CCDev 
awardees, has already declared bankruptcy. Sea Launch is another example of a 
commercial space company that has taken risks in this emerging market and has faced 
setbacks. Their unique launch platform was damaged during a failed launch in 2007. This 
failed launch along with a loss of the market due to delays and questions of reliability 
resulted in the company filing for bankruptcy protection in 2009. Even with this 
significant setback Sea Launch emerged from bankruptcy in 2010 and has a launch 
scheduled for September 2011. 
C. REGULATION 
NASA’s Commercial Crew Transportation System Certification Requirements for 
NASA Low Earth Orbit Missions, while fewer than 40 pages, references over 70 other 
documents with additional requirements. These documents require a program manager 
and five separate milestone reviews for any commercial crew transportation systems. 
These reviews are: System Requirements Review (SRR), System Definition Review 
(SDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR), Critical Design Review (CDR), and 
Operational Readiness Review (ORR). Additionally, any change that affects crew safety 
requires approval from the Johnson Space Center Director. 
NASA’s safety requirements for commercial crew transport are also required to 
be an order of magnitude safer than the Space Shuttle. Specifically, NASA requires a 
Loss of Crew (LOC) probability of no greater than 1 in 1000 launches for both ascent and 
entry. The LOC probability for a 210 day ISS mission shall be no greater than 1 in 270. 
This, in contrast with the Space Shuttle’s actual LOC record of 1 in 67 (when it was 
designed for 1 in 100), brings into question how a commercial company can achieve such 





systems to provide an overall abort effectiveness of 95 percent, a requirement NASA 
itself has never met. The Constellation programs Ares I had an abort effectiveness of 
about 80 to 85 percent (NASA, 2010). 
NASA has requested and implemented recommendations from the commercial 
space industry but the fear of excessive regulation is still a major concern. One of the 
lessons learned from the cancelled Constellation Moon Exploration Program was that 
“major aerospace contractors have sufficient processes such that NASA’s design and 
construction standards are of questionable value. This is a major driver of program fixed 
costs.” The recommendation from this lesson learned is that NASA “should assume the 
burden of meets or exceeds evaluations on itself instead of making the contractor prove it 
meets NASA requirements” and “most requirements should become guidelines or best 
practices.” The lessons learned also targets process simplification and makes a key point 
on NASA’s Constellation program requirements: “permanent or semipermanent waivers 








V. COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION 
The FAA defines space transportation as “the movement of, or means of moving 
objects, such as satellites and vehicles carrying cargo, scientific payloads, or passengers, 
to, from, or in space.” The U.S. commercial space transportation industry became 
prevalent after the loss of the Challenger Shuttle in 1986, which caused the banning of 
commercial payloads from flying aboard the Space Shuttle. Before the Challenger 
accident, all commercial satellites were launched by the government (FAA AST, 2010). 
A. REGULATION 
NASA has taken significant steps in ensuring the success of their partners in the 
COTS (Figure 5) and CRS programs. NASA’s continued investments in these programs 
are vital to enabling the commercial space transportation industry. In order for NASA to 
regain access to the ISS it will need to be flexible and willing to compromise with 
commercial space companies in some areas. A continued partnership between NASA, the 
FAA, and commercial space companies will be required for a successful space 
transportation market and to ensure redundant requirements do not stifle the emerging 
market. “NASA, FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB for mishap 
investigations) should develop and implement clear and common requirements and 





Figure 5.   NASA COTS 
NASA’s missions will still require additional regulation to achieve their more 
strict survivability requirements. This additional regulation will come at a cost that 
NASA is partially funding through their CCDev program. While, this will result in 
increased safety for NASA’s astronauts, it will become a burden to the commercial space 
industry for those without NASA funding or if NASA is unable to continue funding 
CCDev. If the emerging space market is profitable, NASA may have difficulty finding a 
commercial provider willing to meet their additional requirements if an easier and more 
profitable market exists. If this does happen NASA will have few alternatives other than 






would be to continue purchasing seats on the Russian Soyuz rocket to the ISS. The U.S. 
would not be in a good position to bargain for a reasonable price if no other alternative is 
available. 
Government regulation of emerging markets is also a determining factor in an 
industries success or failure. Over regulation could lead to stifling the market while under 
regulation could lead to bad business practices or even a lack of basic safety requirements 
causing unnecessary risk. To prevent this, both NASA and the FAA requested input from 
private industry on their regulations and implemented their recommendations as part of 
their final products. This cooperation and co-ownership responsibility is important to 
ensure fair regulation and flexibility for the changing space transportation industry. 
The regulatory standards governing human space flight must evolve as the 
industry matures so that regulations neither stifle technology development 
nor expose crew or space flight participants to avoidable risks as the 
public comes to expect greater safety for crew and space flight participants 
from the industry. (108th Congress, 2004) 
One interesting aspect of both FAA and NASA regulations is the ability for a 
commercial company to demonstrate an alternate method of compliance for certain 
requirements. This means that if the company can prove their system can meet or exceed 
the FAA or NASA requirement, in a different but acceptable manner, then they can still 
receive approval without having to meet the specific requirement. This flexibility could 
allow the commercial industry to not only meet requirements more easily, but even 
demonstrate better ways of doing business.  
B. SAFETY 
The question of system reliability from a commercial company attempting to 
make a profit is also an important one. No existing rocket has a proven track record that 
meets NASA’s required probability of LOC being less than 1 in 1000 launches. While 
such reliability is possible to achieve, it may come at a cost that is not feasible for most 
commercial companies. NASA’s solution to this problem was to design a spacecraft with 




versions of the Space Shuttle were capable of ejecting their crew in an emergency. This is 
an example of how NASA achieves mission assurance through technology insertion. A 
commercial company is likely to instead focus on relatively simple systems with a greater 
emphasis on survivable aborts to ensure occupant safety without excessive costs (FAA, 
2010). 
The FAA will pursue safety through procedural improvements. The commercial 
industry will focus on operational safety but will also take into account cost effectiveness. 
As a research organization NASA implements their mission assurance and safety 
requirements through technology improvements. These three unique approaches to safety 
each have their own associated costs and benefits. Future safety regulation will have to 
account for all three disparate views and compromises will have to be made. 
The FAA will initially focus on public safety as the commercial space industry 
matures. An accident during these early stages of development could have grave 
consequences. It is in the interest of all stakeholders to ensure safe operations; especially 
the commercial space industry. A major accident would receive extensive media 
coverage and jeopardize any business case and even a business’s brand name. This may 
also force the FAA to step in and speed up regulation. While further regulation is 
expected and required, it may be more beneficial to the industry to allow it to develop its 
own lessons learned and best practices. At some point the FAA, just like the airline 
industry, will expand its regulations to include passenger safety as space transportation 
becomes more prevalent. 
C. FORECAST 
An emerging space transportation industry market forecast could be affected by 
many different factors including cost, schedule, performance, risk, technical, regulatory, 
and political. The risk of an accident resulting in the stand-down of operations for an 
investigation, and the uncertainty of informed consent being sufficient to protect 





1. Orbital Commercial Space Transportation 
The emerging orbital commercial space transportation market has a small measure 
of certainty provided by the NASA ISS resupply and crew missions displayed in Figure 6 
(FAA AST, 2011). Launch contracts have been signed and NASA’s ISS traffic model for 
the ISS has been released. This consistent source of demand will be important in an 
otherwise uncertain market. The only historical demand for commercial orbital space 
transportation has been by a small number of space tourists who have paid to travel into 
orbit listed in Table 4 (NASA, 2011). 
 







Table 4.   Space Tourists 
After 2016 NASA plans on a more competitive market with more suppliers to 
meet their demands. Until then, NASA will serve as the anchor tenant customer to offset 
the lack of investment from an unstable market. NASA has developed SAA’s with 
commercial companies for their crew and cargo transports to the ISS and this limits their 
control. NASA is still developing its acquisition strategy for the commercial industry. If 
NASA decides to switch from SAA’s to the more traditional Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) it will add more control and oversight that will increase costs. 
In 2011, the entire orbital launch market is forecasted to include 276 payloads 
requiring 130 launches. The majority of these launches are for commercial 
telecommunications. Iridium has recently signed the largest single commercial launch 
contract with SpaceX totaling 492 million U.S. dollars to launch its Iridium Next 
constellation. The historical orbital launch data for 2001 through 2010 is in Table 5. The 






Table 5.   Historical Payloads and Launches 
 
Table 6.   Payload and Launch Forecast 
2. Sub-Orbital Commercial Space Flight 
Predicting future demand in an emerging market that has only five previous 
launches (in 2004) is a difficult process full of uncertainty. With no significant historical 
data or published schedules there is very little data to base a forecast on. The earliest 




received deposits from more than 400 flight participants willing to pay 200,000 dollars 
for a ride on SpaceShipTwo. Many other commercial companies have expressed plans for 
future launches including Masten, Armadillo, XCOR, and Blue Origin. 
The demand for sub-orbital flights, beyond the scope of tourism, is uncertain. 
Many other markets that could benefit from these flights include: point-to-point 
passenger travel, time sensitive deliveries (such as human organs), microgravity research, 





VI. MID-ATLANTIC REGIONAL SPACEPORT 
A. HISTORY 
The Mid-Atlantic Regional Spaceport (MARS) was established in 1997 by the 
Virginia Commercial Space Flight Authority (VCSFA), and is a state-funded, nonprofit 
organization. MARS leases land from NASA Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), which was 
established in 1945 and is under the direct management of NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center. WFF is the oldest, most prolific launch site in the World in continuous operation 
with over 15,000 launches. A Reimbursable Space Act Agreement (RSAA) dictates how 
launch and range support will be provided to the VCSFA. This includes encouraging 
private sector commercial space use of NASA infrastructure and services in accordance 
with national space policy and Chapter 701 of Title 49, United States Code. These 
services would be provided on a noninterference basis as determined by NASA (NASA, 
2007). 
B. EXPERIENCE 
VCSFA has made substantial progress with respect to regulation compliance, 
infrastructure development, launch experience, and planned operations to be well-
positioned as a commercial launch site that has the potential for continued growth as a 
commercial spaceport. Table 7 lists past launches conducted at the MARS. Table 8 lists 





Launch Date Mission 
December 2006 TacSat-2 
April 2007 NFIRE 
May 2009 TacSat-3 
June 2011 ORS-1 
Table 7.   MARS Past Launches 
 
Launch Date Mission Launch Pad 
December 2011 Orbital Sciences Taurus II Rocket Test Flight 0-A 
2012 Demonstration Launch of Orbital Sciences Taurus II Rocket 0-A 
2012 Two Taurus II Re-Supply Missions to the ISS 0-A 
May 2013 NASA LADEE 0-B 
2013 Two Taurus II Re-Supply Missions to the ISS 0-A 
2014 Two Taurus II Re-Supply Missions to the ISS 0-A 
2015 Two Taurus II Re-Supply Missions to the ISS 0-A 
Table 8.   MARS Launch Manifest 
C. MARS ADVANTAGES 
MARS is co-located with a Federal range, the only NASA range, and has a 
payload mass advantage to higher-inclination orbits. This includes the best domestic 
launch azimuth to the ISS and minimal land overflight (See Figure 7). Minimal land 
overflight is an important cost advantage when insuring launches. WFF maintains an 
aeronautical research airport, with two 8,000-foot FAA-certified runways, that can 
support large transport aircraft. The FAA managed airspace surrounding WFF includes 




equipped, state-of-the-art Range Control Center, fixed and mobile telemetry, optical, and 
television systems, an extensive fixed and mobile-instrumented range, and many other 
support services (NASA WFF, 2010). 
 
Figure 7.   MARS Launch Profiles 
WFF is the only orbital launch facility owned and managed exclusively by 
NASA. This NASA ownership and management allows easier scheduling and a higher 
degree of certainty for scheduling launches. WFF has facilities for the receipt, inspection, 
assembly, checkout, and storage of rocket motors and other pyrotechnic devices. The 
launch site includes six launch pads, three blockhouses, assembly buildings, and radar 
facilities for tracking and surveillance (Maryland, 2011). 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has implemented many incentives to lower the 
tax burden of commercial space companies to reduce the costs and risks of doing 




development of the commercial space industry. Businesses sponsored by the VCSFA for 
ISS resupply are exempted from Virginia sales and use taxes due to the Zero G Zero Tax 
Act of 2008. This was preceded by the Liability and Immunity Act of 2007, which 
reduced commercial space companies’ risk in pursuing human space flight. MARS and 
WFF are also located within a Foreign Trade Zone. This makes hardware and equipment 
exempt from import/export duties (FAA CST, 2009). 
Other advantages to federal government, domestic commercial and international 
launch customers (Joint Maryland and Virginia Working Group, 2004): 
• Unique orbital access afforded by a mid-latitude launch site; 
• Available capacity to responsively meet launch needs and absorb new business; 
• A Federal license to conduct commercial space launches; 
• A formal partnership with NASA that permits and enables use of the Wallops 
Flight Facility and its personnel; 
• User-friendly local, state, regional and federal synergistic infrastructure; 
• Range safety afforded by immediate coastal proximity to the over-water Atlantic 
range airspace complex; 
• Access to mid-Atlantic and national-capital area, federal and commercial 
technology organizations; 
• Available host facilities and industrial parks to host business growth; 
• Available local workforce; 
• Business friendly state government institutions willing to support development 
and expansion of technology firms; 
• A tradition of creativity and an open exchange of knowledge consistent with 
security needs; 
D. REGULATION 
As a commercial spaceport, MARS falls under FAA regulation and is licensed as 
a site operator for commercial launches. However, due to its collocation with a Federal 
range it must also meet NASA regulations. Some of the FAA requirements may be 





be met through the FAA process or by using an existing Federal range’s analysis. Federal 
launches by the DoD or NASA do not currently require an FAA license if they contract 
directly with the Federal range. 
Every FAA licensed launch will include a policy, safety, payload, and 
environmental review and must meet launch insurance requirements. In addition, a 
launch operator on a Federal range must also be compliant with the Federal range’s safety 
guidelines (14 C.F.R. §415 subpart C). The NASA and FAA range requirements are 
expected to be more compatible in the future to reduce duplicate regulation. This 
combination of disparate entities will be a difficult process that will take extensive effort 
from both agencies. It is vital that “NASA and the FAA agree on a coherent set of 
requirements and regulations that enable fielded systems to serve both government and 









VII. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION 
The MARS needs to continue to distinguish itself as a leading spaceport. Virginia 
has led the way in promoting its space industry and will need to continue these efforts. 
The symbiotic relationship between the MARS and NASA’s WFF will need to continue 
to evolve. With the declining NASA budget a thriving commercial space industry will be 
vital in reducing operating costs and ensuring stability and growth during a time of 
Federal downsizing. NASA has studied the possibility of closing WFF several times. This 
closure has been prevented by strong political opposition. It is in the best interests of the 
MARS, NASA, and the commercial space industry to ensure each other’s success and 
continued utilization of WFF. 
Since NASA awarded Virginia-based Orbital Science Corporation a CRS 
contract, a consistent line of funding is in place that must be utilized to the greatest extent 
possible. NASA will be required to purchase, at a minimum, another 27 cargo flights and 
10 crew flights through 2020. The existing contract and the possible future NASA 
contracts should be used as the anchor tenant to attract more business. The U.S. Air Force 
Operationally Responsive Space Office has launched four spacecraft from Wallops with 
the possibility for more launches in the future. This relationship should continue to be 
developed and MARS promoted as a responsive, lean launch provider. While the orbital 
market has a much higher entry cost than the sub-orbital market, continued demonstration 
of MARS as a lean launch provider could attract emerging space companies like Bigelow 
Aerospace. 
The sub-orbital market should take advantage of WFF’s existing airport and 
infrastructure to perform sub-orbital flights. The MARS’ unique location on the East 
Coast and near the nation’s capital, and other population centers, places it in a key 
position to offer sub-orbital flights. The sub-orbital tourism, point-to-point, and research 
markets are likely to be the highest in demand and should be targeted for future growth. 
Wallops has a long history of suborbital research and could expand this field to include 




FAA’s commercial space transportation regulations are in their infancy but are 
still minimal. The NASA regulations while more mature and far more complex are being 
adapted for commercial usage. NASA plans on leaving all commercial space licensing to 
the FAA. In the future even a NASA mission launched from a Federal range would 
require an FAA license. NASA is likely to still have their own safety requirements that 
will be redundant to FAA requirements. A key part to enabling commercial space 
transportation industry at MARS is reducing the uncertainty about how NASA and FAA 
regulations will coexist. 
The nascent commercial space transportation industry has been enabled by NASA 
investment in COTS, CCDev and CRS. This, along with the FAA’s matching grants and 
other Federal and state incentives, has helped jump-start the commercial space 
transportation industry. The possible roadblocks of excessive regulation have been 
minimized by the FAA’s limited Final Rule on Crew and Space Flight Requirements and 
the CSLAA. By not certifying vehicles as safe, the FAA acknowledges that passengers 
will fly at their own risk. While this congressional “hands off” mandate will encourage 
research and development in this emerging market it could backfire if an accident occurs 
that results in more strict regulation. 
After December 23, 2012 the FAA may propose new regulations on the 
commercial space industry without restriction. The amount of regulations will be 
dependent upon how much the commercial space industry has matured. Industry lessons 
learned and best practices are needed to determine future requirements. The FAA has 
already held public meetings to address many of the concerns facing this emerging 
market. Specifically, the deconfliction of FAA and NASA regulations will be necessary 
to prevent duplication of efforts. Both regulators need to ensure their requirements are 
compatible or complementary for both government and non-government organizations. 
The development of a robust commercial space transportation industry is 
important to the U. S. and its National Security in many different areas. Economically, a 
strong space industry and a vigorous space launch schedule will promote space jobs and 




greatly benefit National Security Space programs and develop national capabilities in 
new technical realms. Another important impact to National Security Space is the 
required expansion and growth of the space transportation infrastructure. Similar to the 
railroads, interstate highways, and airports of today a space transportation infrastructure 
will need to be developed and will be a requirement for future growth and expansion. 
Without this infrastructure National Security Space will be required to maintain its own 
aging infrastructure and would not be able to benefit from new construction, technology 
and innovations that the commercial space sector would develop on its own. 
In a shrinking Global economy the commercial space industry will be vital in 
maintaining the competitive edge in, and our access to, space. The more developed the U. 
S. commercial space industry is the more likely it will be able to adapt and overcome any 
challenges it is faced with. It is in the U.S. Government’s strategic interest to remain a 
leader in the Global space transportation industry. This emerging commercial space 
transportation market has the potential to become a thriving industry with proper 
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